

# Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate

Bruno Blanchet

INRIA Paris  
Bruno.Blanchet@inria.fr

Joint work with Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Nadim Kobeissi

June 2017

# Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3

- Next version of the most popular secure channel protocol.
  - Completely redesigned from TLS 1.2
  - After 20 drafts, on the verge of standardization

# Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3

- Next version of the most popular secure channel protocol.
  - Completely redesigned from TLS 1.2
  - After 20 drafts, on the verge of standardization
- Why did we need a new protocol?
  - **Security:** remove broken legacy crypto constructions

# Attacks against TLS 1.2

RC4	Keystream biases	[Mar'13]
Lucky13	MAC-Encode-Encrypt CBC	[Mar'13]
POODLE	SSLv3 MAC-Encode-Encrypt	[Dec'14]
FREAK	Export-grade 512-bit RSA	[Mar'15]
LOGJAM	Export-grade 512-bit DH	[May'15]
SLOTH	RSA-MD5 signatures	[Jan'16]
DROWN	SSLv2 PSA-PKCS#1v1.5 Enc	[Mar'16]
SWEET32	3DES Encryption	[Oct'16]

# Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3

- Next version of the most popular secure channel protocol.
  - Completely redesigned from TLS 1.2
  - After 20 drafts, on the verge of standardization
- Why did we need a new protocol?
  - **Security:** remove broken legacy crypto constructions
  - **Efficiency:** reduce handshake roundtrip latency
    - 0-RTT when the client and server have a pre-shared key
    - 0.5-RTT

# Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3

- Next version of the most popular secure channel protocol.
  - Completely redesigned from TLS 1.2
  - After 20 drafts, on the verge of standardization
- Why did we need a new protocol?
  - **Security**: remove broken legacy crypto constructions
  - **Efficiency**: reduce handshake roundtrip latency
    - 0-RTT when the client and server have a pre-shared key
    - 0.5-RTT
  - These are potentially contradictory goals
- **Needs extensive security analysis before deployment!**
  - The IETF called for academics to formally analyze the protocol drafts.

# Analyzing TLS 1.3

- Many published analyses for intermediate TLS 1.3 drafts
  - Cryptography proofs (of drafts 5,9,10)  
[Dowling et al. CCS'15, Krawczyk et al. EuroS&P'16, Li et al. S&P'16]
  - Symbolic protocol analysis (of draft 10)  
[Cremers et al. S&P'16]
  - Verified implementation (of draft 18 record protocol)  
[Bhargavan et al. S&P'17]
  - Symbolic and computational proofs (of draft 18)  
[Bhargavan et al. S&P'17; **this talk**]
- Are we done? Is it secure?
  - If we deploy TLS 1.3, will it expose new attacks?

# TLS 1.2 and its proofs: a checkered history

Historically, published proofs of TLS missed many attacks

Large gaps between simplified models and the deployed protocol

- ① Proofs ignored “ugly” implementation details
  - e.g. AES-CBC padding, RSA-PKCS#1v1.5 padding
- ② Proofs relied on strong crypto assumptions on primitives
  - e.g. collision resistant hash functions, strong Diffie-Hellman groups
- ③ Proofs ignored composition with obsolete/unpopular modes
  - e.g. SSLv2, EXPORT ciphers, renegotiation


How do we ensure that TLS 1.3 proofs do not fall into these traps?



# Our approach


- Use automated verification tools to handle protocol complexity
  - Easy to extend as protocol evolves, or as we model new features
- Symbolically analyze protocol against known attack vectors
  - Find or prove the absence of downgrade attacks to TLS 1.2 (using **ProVerif**)
- Build a mechanically-checked cryptographic proof of TLS 1.3
  - Explore the crypto assumptions needed by TLS 1.3 (using **CryptoVerif**)
- Synchronize verified models with RFC and its implementations
  - Extract ProVerif model from an interoperable implementation (**RefTLS**)

# Our vision: one model, three tasks



(Inspired by: Verified interoperable implementations of security protocols, TOPLAS 2008.)

# Our current toolchain



# Symbolic analysis to find downgrade (and other) attacks

## Recent attacks on legacy crypto in TLS:

RC4	Keystream biases	[Mar'13]
Lucky13	MAC-Encode-Encrypt CBC	[Mar'13]
POODLE	SSLv3 MAC-Encode-Encrypt	[Dec'14]
FREAK	Export-grade 512-bit RSA	[Mar'15]
LOGJAM	Export-grade 512-bit DH	[May'15]
SLOTH	RSA-MD5 signatures	[Jan'16]
DROWN	SSLv2 PSA-PKCS#1v1.5 Enc	[Mar'16]

Legacy crypto remains in TLS libraries for backwards compatibility.  
Is TLS 1.3 secure, if it is deployed alongside older versions of TLS?

- Can a man-in-the-middle **downgrade** TLS 1.3 peers to use legacy crypto?

# Modeling weak crypto in ProVerif

- Classic symbolic (Dolev-Yao) protocol models idealize crypto
  - Perfect black-boxes that cannot be opened without relevant key
- We model agile crypto primitives parameterized by algorithm
  - Given a **strong** algorithm, the primitive behaves ideally
  - Given a **weak** algorithm, the primitive completely breaks

# Modeling weak crypto in ProVerif

- Classic symbolic (Dolev-Yao) protocol models idealize crypto
  - Perfect black-boxes that cannot be opened without relevant key
- We model agile crypto primitives parameterized by algorithm
  - Given a **strong** algorithm, the primitive behaves ideally
  - Given a **weak** algorithm, the primitive completely breaks
  - e.g. a weak Diffie-Hellman group behaves like a trivial 1-element group

```

fun dh_ideal(element, bitstring): element.
equation forall x: bitstring, y: bitstring;
    dh_ideal(dh_ideal(G,x),y) = dh_ideal(dh_ideal(G,y),x).

fun dh_exp(group, element, bitstring): element
reduc forall g: group, e: element, x: bitstring;
    dh_exp(WeakDH,e,x) = BadElement
otherwise forall g: group, e: element, x: bitstring;
    dh_exp(StrongDH,BadElement,x) = BadElement
otherwise forall g: group, e: element, x: bitstring;
    dh_exp(StrongDH,e,x) = dh_ideal(e,x).
  
```

# Modeling weak crypto in ProVerif

- Classic symbolic (Dolev-Yao) protocol models idealize crypto
  - Perfect black-boxes that cannot be opened without relevant key
- We model agile crypto primitives parameterized by algorithm
  - Given a **strong** algorithm, the primitive behaves ideally
  - Given a **weak** algorithm, the primitive completely breaks
  - e.g. a weak Diffie-Hellman group behaves like a trivial 1-element group
  - Similarly, we model strong and weak authenticated encryption, hash functions, MACs, RSA encryption and signatures.
- Our model is overly conservative, it may not indicate real exploits
  - Our goal is to verify TLS 1.3 against future attacks on legacy crypto

# Modeling TLS 1.3 in ProVerif


## TLS 1.3 1-RTT handshake

- 12 messages in 3 flights, 16 derived keys, then data exchange

+ PSK-based 0-RTT  
+ TLS 1.2

- Agile Crypto: ~400 lines
- TLS models: ~500 lines

Modeling is easy,  
verification takes effort



### Key Derivation Functions:

HKDF-Extract( $k, s$ ) =  $\text{HMAC-H}^k(s)$   
 $\text{hkdf-expand-label}_1(s, l, h) = \text{HMAC-H}^s(\text{len}_{H(0)} \| \text{"TLS 1.3,"} \| \|h\|_{0x01})$

Derive-Secret( $s, l, m$ ) =  $\text{hkdf-expand-label}_1(s, l, H(m))$

### 1-RTT Key Schedule:

$\text{kdf}_0 = \text{HKDF-Extract}(0^{\text{len}_{H(0)}}, 0^{\text{len}_{H(0)}})$   
 $\text{kdf}_{hs}(es, e) = \text{HKDF-Extract}(es, e)$   
 $\text{kdf}_{ms}(hs, \text{log}_1) = ms, k_c^b, k_s^b, k_c^m, k_s^m$  where  $ms = \text{HKDF-Extract}(hs, 0^{\text{len}_{H(0)}})$   
 $hts_c = \text{Derive-Secret}(hs, hts_c, \text{log}_1)$   
 $hts_s = \text{Derive-Secret}(hs, hts_s, \text{log}_1)$   
 $k_c^b = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(hts_c, \text{key}, \text{" "})$   
 $k_s^b = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(hts_s, \text{key}, \text{" "})$   
 $k_c^m = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(hts_c, \text{finished}, \text{" "})$   
 $k_s^m = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(hts_s, \text{finished}, \text{" "})$   
 $\text{kdf}_k(ms, \text{log}_4) = k_c, k_s, ems$  where  
 $ats_c = \text{Derive-Secret}(ms, ats_c, \text{log}_4)$   
 $ats_s = \text{Derive-Secret}(ms, ats_s, \text{log}_4)$   
 $ems = \text{Derive-Secret}(ms, ems, \text{log}_4)$   
 $k_c = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(ats_c, \text{key}, \text{" "})$   
 $k_s = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(ats_s, \text{key}, \text{" "})$   
 $\text{kdf}_{psk}(ms, \text{log}_7) = psk'$  where  
 $psk' = \text{Derive-Secret}(ms, rms, \text{log}_7)$

### PSK-based Key Schedule:

$\text{kdf}_{es}(psk) = es, k^b$  where  
 $es = \text{HKDF-Extract}(0^{\text{len}_{H(0)}}, psk)$   
 $k^b = \text{Derive-Secret}(es, \text{pbk}, \text{" "})$   
 $\text{kdf}_{0RTT}(es, \text{log}_1) = k_c$  where  
 $ets_c = \text{Derive-Secret}(es, ets_c, \text{log}_1)$   
 $k_c = \text{hkdf-expand-label}(ets_c, \text{key}, \text{" "})$



# Writing and verifying security goals

- We state security queries for data sent between honest users
  - **Secrecy**: messages between honest peers are unknown to an adversary
  - **Authenticity**: messages between honest peers cannot be tampered
  - **Replay prevention**: messages between honest peers cannot be replayed
  - **Forward secrecy**: secrecy holds even if the peers' long-term keys are leaked after the session is complete
- Secrecy query for  $\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)$  sent from anonymous  $C$  to server  $S$

**query**  $\text{attacker}(\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)) \implies \text{false}$

# Refining security queries

- **QUERY:** is  $\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)$  secret?

**query**  $\text{attacker}(\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)) \implies \text{false}$

- **FALSE:** ProVerif finds a counterexample if  $S$ 's private key is compromised.

# Refining security queries

- **QUERY:** is  $\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)$  secret  
as long as  $S$  is uncompromised?

**query**  $\text{attacker}(\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)) \implies$   
 $\text{event}(\text{WeakOrCompromisedKey}(S))$

- **FALSE:** ProVerif finds a counterexample if the AE algorithm is weak.

# Refining security queries

- **QUERY:** Strongest secrecy query that can be proved in our model

**query**  $\text{attacker}(\text{msg}(\text{conn}, S)) \implies$   
 $\text{event}(\text{WeakOrCompromisedKey}(S)) \vee$   
 $\text{event}(\text{ServerChoosesAE}(\text{conn}, S, \text{WeakAE})) \vee$   
 $\text{event}(\text{ServerChoosesKEX}(\text{conn}, S, \text{WeakDH})) \vee$   
 $\text{event}(\text{ServerChoosesKEX}(\text{conn}', S, \text{WeakRSADecryption})) \vee$   
 $\text{event}(\text{ServerChoosesHash}(\text{conn}', S, \text{WeakHash}))$

- **TRUE:** ProVerif finds no counterexample

# Conclusion: Downgrade security for TLS 1.2 + TLS 1.3

- Messages on a TLS 1.3 connection between honest peers are secret:
  - ① if the connection does not use a weak AE algorithm,
  - ② the connection does not use a weak DH group,
  - ③ the server **never** uses a weak hash algorithm for signing, and
  - ④ the server **never** participates in a TLS 1.2 RSA key exchange.
- Analysis confirms preconditions for downgrade resilience in TLS 1.3
  - identifies weak algorithms in TLS 1.2 that can harm TLS 1.3 security

# Mechanized computational proof

- **Mechanized** verification of **TLS 1.3 Draft-18** in the **computational** model.
  - + Handshake with PSK and/or DHE.
  - + Handshake with and without client authentication.
  - + 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT data, key updates.
  - - No post-handshake authentication.
  - - No version or ciphersuite negotiation: only strong algorithms.
  - - For PSK-DHE, we do not prove forward secrecy wrt. the compromise of PSK.
- We prove security properties of the initial handshake, the handshake with pre-shared key, and the record protocol using CryptoVerif.
- We compose these pieces manually.

# CryptoVerif, <http://cryptoverif.inria.fr/>


CryptoVerif is a **semi-automatic prover** that:

- works in the **computational model**.
- generates **proofs by sequences of games**.
- proves **secrecy** and **correspondence** properties.
- provides a **generic** method for specifying properties of **cryptographic primitives** which handles MACs (message authentication codes), symmetric encryption, public-key encryption, signatures, hash functions, Diffie-Hellman key agreements, ...
- works for  **$N$  sessions** (polynomial in the security parameter), with an **active adversary**.
- gives a bound on the **probability** of an attack (exact security).

# Proofs by sequences of games

CryptoVerif produces **proofs by sequences of games**, like those of cryptographers [Shoup, Bellare&Rogaway]:

- The first game is the **real protocol**.
- One goes from one game to the next by syntactic transformations or by applying the definition of security of a cryptographic primitive. The difference of probability between consecutive games is negligible.
- The last game is **"ideal"**: the security property is obvious from the form of the game.  
(The advantage of the adversary is 0 for this game.)






# Input and output of the tool

- ① Prepare the input file containing
  - the specification of the **protocol** to study (initial game),
  - the **security assumptions** on the cryptographic primitives,
  - the **security properties** to prove.
- ② Run CryptoVerif
  - Automatic proof strategy or manual guidance.
- ③ CryptoVerif outputs
  - the **sequence of games** that leads to the proof,
  - a **succinct explanation** of the transformations performed between games,
  - an upper bound of the **probability** of success of an attack.


# Structure of the proof

- ① Computational assumptions
- ② Lemmas on primitives
- ③ Protocol pieces
  - Handshake without pre-shared key
  - Handshake with pre-shared key (PSK and PSK-DHE)
  - Record protocol
- ④ Compose the pieces together

# Structure of the proof: final composition



# Key schedule (Draft-18, excerpt)



# Assumptions (1)

- **Diffie-Hellman:**
  - gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH)
    - needed in particular for 0.5-RTT
  - Diffie-Hellman group of prime order
  - Diffie-Hellman group elements different from  $0^{len_H()}$ 
    - avoids confusion between handshakes with and without Diffie-Hellman exchange.
  - Diffie-Hellman group elements different from  $len_H() || \text{"TLS 1.3,"} || I || h || 0x01$ .
    - avoids collision between  $\text{HKDF-Extract}(es, e)$  and  $\text{Derive-Secret}(es, pbk, \text{""}, \text{"})$  or  $\text{Derive-Secret}(es, ets_c, log_1)$ .
    - independently discovered and discussed on the TLS mailing list.
    - change in Draft-19 makes this assumption unnecessary: add a Derive-Secret stage before HKDF-Extract.

# Assumptions (2)

- **Signatures:** sign is UF-CMA.
- **Hash functions:** H is collision-resistant.
- **HMAC:**
  - $x \mapsto \text{HMAC-H}^{0^{\text{len}_H()}}(x)$  and  $x \mapsto \text{HMAC-H}^{\text{kdf}_0}(x)$  are independent random oracles.
  - HMAC-H is a PRF, for keys different from  $0^{\text{len}_H()}$  and  $\text{kdf}_0$ .
- **Authenticated Encryption:** IND-CPA and INT-CTXT provided the same nonce is never used twice with the same key.

# Lemmas on primitives: MAC and signatures

- $\text{mac}_H^k(m) = \text{mac}^k(H(m))$  is an SUF-CMA MAC.
- $\text{sign}_H^{sk}(m) = \text{sign}^{sk}(H(m))$  is an UF-CMA signature.

# Lemmas on primitives: key schedule

## Lemma

*When  $es$  is a fresh random value,*

- $e \mapsto \text{HKDF-Extract}(es, e)$  and
- $log_1 \mapsto \text{Derive-Secret}(es, ets_c, log_1)$   
*are indistinguishable from independent random functions, and*
- $k^b = \text{Derive-Secret}(es, pbk, "")$  and
- $\text{HKDF-Extract}(es, 0^{len_H()})$   
*are indistinguishable from independent fresh random values independent from these random functions.*

- Proved using CryptoVerif.
- Similar lemmas for other parts of the key schedule.
- Used as assumption in the proof of the protocol.



# Handshake without pre-shared key: model

- Model a honest client and a honest server.
- May interact with dishonest clients and servers included in the adversary.
- Ignore negotiation (`RetryRequest`).
- Give the handshake keys to adversary:
  - The adversary can encrypt and decrypt messages.
  - The security proof does not rely on that.
- Server always authenticated.
- With and without client authentication.
- The honest client and server may be dynamically compromised.

# Handshake without pre-shared key: honest sessions

- The **client** is in a **honest session** if
  - the server public key is the one of the honest server, and
  - the honest server is not compromised, or it is compromised and the messages received by the client have been sent by the honest server.
- The **server** is in a **honest session** if
  - client authenticated:
    - the client public key is the one of honest client, and
    - the honest client is not compromised, or it is compromised and the messages received by the server have been sent by the honest client.
  - client not authenticated: the Diffie-Hellman share received by the server has been sent by the honest client.

# Handshake without pre-shared key: security (1)

- **Key authentication:**
  - If the honest client terminates a honest session, then the honest server has accepted a session with that client, and they agree on:
    - keys  $ats_c$ ,  $ats_s$ , and  $ems$ ,
    - all messages until the server `Finished` message.
  - If the honest server terminates a honest session, then the honest client has accepted a session with that server, and they agree on the keys and on all messages.
- **Replay prevention:** the previous properties are injective.
- **Key secrecy:** the keys
  - $ats_c$ ,  $ems$ ,  $psk'$  client side, when the client terminates a honest session;
  - $ats_s$  server side, when the server sends its `Finished` message and the received Diffie-Hellman share comes from the client (for 0.5-RTT)are indistinguishable from independent fresh random values.

# Handshake without pre-shared key: security (2)

- **Same key:**
  - If the honest client terminates a honest session and the honest server has accepted a session with the same messages, then they have the same key.
  - If the honest server terminates a honest session and the honest client has accepted a session with the same messages, then they have the same key.
- **Unique channel identifier:**
  - $psk'$  or  $H(\log_7)$ :  
If a client session and a server session have the same  $psk'$  or  $H(\log_7)$ , then all their parameters are equal (collision-resistance).
  - $ems$ :  
If a client session and a server session have the same  $ems$ , then they have the same  $\log_4$  (collision-resistance), so all their parameters are equal (CryptoVerif).

# Handshake without pre-shared key: guidance

- Signature under  $sk_S$ .
- Introduce tests to distinguish cases, depending on
  - whether the Diffie-Hellman share received by the server is a share  $g^{x'}$  from the client,
  - and whether the Diffie-Hellman share received by the client is the share  $g^y$  generated by the server upon receipt of  $g^{x'}$ .
- Random oracle assumption on  $x \mapsto \text{HMAC-H}^{\text{kdfo}}(x)$ .
- Replace variables that contain  $g^{x'y}$  with their values to make equality tests  $m = g^{x'y}$  appear.
- Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
- $\Rightarrow$  the handshake secret  $hs$  is a fresh random value.
- Lemmas on key schedule  $\Rightarrow$  other keys are fresh random values.
- MAC.
- Signature under  $sk_C$ .

# Handshake with pre-shared key: model

- Includes handshakes with and without Diffie-Hellman exchange.
- Includes 0-RTT.
- Ignore the ticket  $\text{enc}^{k_t}(psk)$ ; consider a honest client and a honest server that share the PSK.
- Give the handshake keys to adversary (as before).
- Certificates optional, since the client and server are already authenticated by the PSK.

# Handshake with pre-shared key: security (1)

Same properties as for the initial handshake, but

- **No compromise of PSK.**
  - Limitation of CryptoVerif: cannot prove forward secrecy wrt. to the compromise of PSK for PSK-DHE.
- Weaker properties for 0-RTT:
  - **Key authentication:** No authentication for  $ets_c$ :
    - several binders, and only one of them is checked;
    - the adversary can alter the others, yielding a different  $ets_c$  server-side.
  - **Replay prevention:** No replay protection for  $ets_c$ .
  - **Secrecy of keys:** The keys  $ets_c$  server-side are not independent of each other, due to the replay.

## Handshake with pre-shared key: security (2)

For 0-RTT, we show:

- **Client-side:** The keys  $ets_c$  are indistinguishable from independent random values.
- **Server-side:**
  - If the received ClientHello message has been sent by the client, then this session matches a session of the client with same key  $ets_c$ .
  - Otherwise,
    - If the ClientHello message has been received before, then the key  $ets_c$  computed by the server is the same as in the previous session with the same ClientHello message.
    - Otherwise, the key  $ets_c$  computed by the server is indistinguishable from a fresh random value, independent from other keys.




# Record protocol

The client and the server share a fresh random traffic secret.

- **Key secrecy:** The updated traffic secret is indistinguishable from a fresh random value.
- **Message secrecy:** When the adversary provides two sets of plaintexts  $m_i$  and  $m'_i$  of the same padded length, it is unable to determine which set is encrypted, even when the updated traffic secret is leaked.
- **Message Authentication:** If a message  $m$  is decrypted by the receiver with a counter  $c$ , then the message  $m$  has been encrypted and sent by an honest sender with the same counter  $c$ .
- **Replay Prevention:** The authentication property above is injective.

# Composition



# Composition: main theorem (informal)

- System  $S$ : key exchange;  $A$  and  $B$  obtain a key such that:
  - **Key secrecy**: The keys obtained by  $A$  are indistinguishable from independent random values.
  - **One-way injective authentication**: For each session of  $B$  that obtains a key  $k$  after sending/receiving  $\widetilde{msg}$ , there is a distinct session of  $A$  that obtains the key  $k$  after sending/receiving  $\widetilde{msg}$ .
  - **Same key**: If  $B$  obtains a key  $k$  after sending/receiving  $\widetilde{msg}$  and  $A$  obtains a key  $k'$  after sending/receiving  $\widetilde{msg}$ , then  $k = k'$ .
- System  $S'$  assumes a fresh random key shared by  $A'$  and  $B'$ .
- The composed system  $S_{composed}$  runs the key exchange followed by  $A'$  with the key obtained by  $A$  and  $B'$  with the key obtained by  $B$ .
- The security properties of  $S$  and  $S'$  carry over to  $S_{composed}$ .

# Composition (in progress)

- The previous theorem allows to perform most compositions.
- More tricky composition theorems for **0-RTT**, because the properties are weaker.
- A simpler composition theorem for **key update**.

# Mechanized computational proof: conclusion

- **Mechanized** verification of **TLS 1.3 Draft-18** in the **computational** model.
  - + Handshake with PSK and/or DHE.
  - + Handshake with and without client authentication.
  - + 0-RTT and 0.5-RTT data, key updates.
  - - No post-handshake authentication.
  - - No version or ciphersuite negotiation: only strong algorithms.
  - - For PSK-DHE, we do not prove forward secrecy wrt. the compromise of PSK.
- **CryptoVerif** proves properties of the handshake with (resp. without) pre-shared-key and of the record protocol.
- We infer properties of the whole system by **manual composition**.
- **Modular** approach essential to be able to handle such a complex protocol.
- TLS 1.3 Draft-18 is **well-designed** to allow such a proof.

# RefRLS: a reference implementation

- Supports TLS 1.0-1.3 and interoperates with other libraries
  - Supports Draft 20 1-RTT with (EC)DHE and/or PSK (No 0-RTT)
  - Supports common TLS 1.2 modes (RSA, DHE with AES-CBC, AES-GCM)
- Distributed as a JavaScript library for ease of deployment
  - Can be used within Node.js and Electron apps
  - Meant for early adopters and interop testing, not for production code!
- We extract core protocol functions from the implementation
  - Ensures that we did not miss some RFC/implementation details
  - Other parts of the implementation are not verified (unlike miTLS)


# RefTLS architecture

## Mostly written in Flow

- Statically-typed JavaScript
- Identify, isolate protocol core
- Protocol state machine
- Includes all crypto processing: encryption, signing, DHE, ...

## Core written in ProScript

- Typed JavaScript subset that can be compiled to ProVerif [Kobeissi et al. EuroS&P'17]



# Results and limitations

- We present a comprehensive analysis of TLS 1.3 draft 18
  - Symbolic analysis, cryptographic proofs, a reference implementation
- Many limitations, missing features, unverified components
  - Symbolic model ignores resumption, post-handshake authentication
  - Crypto proof ignores negotiation, legacy versions, post-handshake authentication
  - Unverified protocol code: message parsing, crypto library, Node

<http://github.com/inria-prosecco/reftls>